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Abstract 
This article provides a critical view of 
the history of early warning as well as 
existing early warning gorts .  The au- 
thor scrutinizes the "early earning de- 
bate," including what early warning is 
and who the actors might be. The paper 
surveys existing efforts on early warn- 
ingfroma critical perspectiveand raises 
many questions concerning the institu- 
tional obstacles that still need to be ad- 
dressed before we can arrive at a 
functional early warning mechanism 
for the purpose of conflict prevention. 
Cet article prisente sous un angle criti- 
que l'origine et l'holution du concept 
d'alerte p r h t i v e  et des efforts actuel- 
lement ments duns ce domaine. 
L'auteure analyse le dibat portant sur 
la notion d'alerte prhentive, notam- 
ment la question dela dttfinition du con- 
cept ainsi que des acteurs qui peuvent 
ttre impliqub duns le domaine. L'arti- 
cle effectue un examen critique des 4- 
forts menis actuellement et soul2ve 
plusieurs questions concernant les obs- 
tacles institutionnels quidoivent encore 
ttre sumontis avant d'en arriver a eta- 
blir un s y s t h e  d'alerte effcace en ma- 
ti2re de prhention des conjlits. 
"What is early warning?" you may ask 
"It depends on who is asking" is an apt 
reply in that it conflates the definition 
with the question. Yet, whether we 
speak of early warning as the reliable 
forecasting of natural disasters, like 
h~rricane~or earthquakes, or of com- 
plex emergencies like Rwanda, Liberia 
and the former Yugoslavia, we are all 
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generally talking about the ability to 
predict the possible movement or dis- 
placement of people as a result of na- 
ture, conflict or coercion. The real 
questions are: who is responsible for 
prediction especially in so-called com- 
plex humanitarian emergencies, and 
what, if anything, comes after? On the 
natural disaster side, responsibility 
and responses are fairly clearly demar- 
cated. Not so for complex emergencies. 
A recent multi-donor study, evalu- 
ating international emergency assist- 
ance to Rwanda, viewed as a failure 
the efforts of the international system 
to collect and analyze relevant data 
over time and to compare these to 
equally relevant past incidents of 
slaughter in Rwanda and Burundi 
(Adelman and Suluke 1996). In gen- 
eral, the study brought together a sig- 
nificant amount of data as supporting 
evidence of the failure of many actors 
at different levels to live up to their 
responsibilities: first, to act on the 
warnings given and, later, to regulate 
the conflict in Rwanda. 
Based on the view that early warn- 
ing covers many issues and concerns, 
such as military conflict, military 
coups, impending humanitarian dis- 
asters such as famine and flows of refu- 
gees, slaughters and, at the extreme, 
genocide, the multi-donor study un- 
derlined that in the Rwanda case, all of 
these were involved at different stages. 
Throughout, the authors provide evi- 
dence of how the warnings that were 
made were, in some instances, inter- 
preted in purely technical terms, as in 
the case of the UN Rapporteur's report 
in 1993 (Deqni-Sgui 1994); how both 
the UN system and the NGO commu- 
nity failed to link human rights reports 
to genocide; and, further, the failure on 
the part of key actors to acknowledge 
the genocide for reasons ranging from 
lack of interest (as on the part of the 
USA) through complicity (as on the 
part of France and Zaire). Finally, the 
authors answer "yes" to the question, 
"Did those with the capacity to prevent 
and mitigate the genocide have the in- 
formation from which such a conclu- 
sion might be drawn?" In fact, they 
note that specific information about 
plans and conspiracies towards this 
end was picked up by the UN system, 
most significantly in the notorious 
"Black File" of January 1994 (Millwood 
1995). 
If the Rwanda crisis has taught us 
anything, it is that an effective early 
warning system for humanitarian 
emergencies should be designed 
around objectives which are the result 
of cooperation among a range of actors 
in the UN system and directed to initi- 
ating political action at the highest 
level. A number of effective early 
warning systems already exist, but it is 
as though their predictions go unno- 
ticed. We had ample warning on the 
former Yugoslavia, Somalia and 
Rwanda, but none appears to have 
benefited from "early action." As for 
those areas in which early intervention 
or preventive measures were success- 
ful as a result of early warning, it is dif- 
ficult to describe them since these 
events are not featured on CNN. 
The Early Warning Debate 
A rather small group of decision mak- 
ers and those who advise policymak- 
ers on early warning, conflict 
prevention and intervention, are gen- 
erally responsible for the polemics that 
inform the early warning debate. 
Among these, though careful not to 
define early warning, is the group that 
is anxious to point out that early warn- 
ing is not conflict prevention. This 
group chiefly comprises those who 
support the view that early warning is 
somehow related to security issues 
and is really an arm of traditional intel- 
ligence gathering. They are quite 
happy to live with the contradictions 
inherent in defining what early warn- 
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ing is not without acknowledging the 
root causes of displacement and con- 
flict prevention as major elements in 
this regard. This group is the most 
sceptical about early warning as a con- 
cept and downright cynical about the 
potential of any early warning system 
to become the centre for international 
alerts. 
In the middle of the same spectrum 
stands the group that, though still 
sceptical, has reflected on what an 
early warning system, if it existed and 
worked, would do. They posit the view 
that an effective early warning system 
must alert the international commu- 
nity to impending displacement, either 
for preemptive (notice, not preventive) 
action or preparedness. Related to this 
latter view is the belief that effective 
early warning should iden* risk fac- 
and exchange in the interests of early 
warning. Nor is there a decentralized 
system that could be viewed as au- 
thoritative. What we do have are opin- 
ions as to the nature and extent of 
conceptual frameworks through views 
on the need for fewer models and more 
implementation and methodology.' 
In fact, the range of views on early 
warning speaks also to the heart of the 
reluctance of decision makers at all lev- 
els of international affairs, including 
the United Nations, to pay more than 
lip service to early warning initiatives. 
How, we ask, can this continue after 
Rwanda? The answer, in part, lies in 
what the multi-donor study identified 
as a system that does not know what its 
objectives are. In this regard, anumber 
of contributing factors were identified: 
the lack of specialized information 
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tors which can then be used to identify 
vulnerable constituencies and lead to a 
more effective assessment of the need 
for intervention, either graduated or 
immediate-that is, what is the best 
action and at what time? Some among 
this group also believe that early wam- 
ing can only really be accomplished 
outside the UN system most probably 
with and among the internationalnon- 
governmental sector. 
At the other end of this spectrum are 
the groups who are actively pursuing 
the development of theoretical mod- 
els. Some have even developed a 
global system of alerts and have ap- 
plied them to actual situations. For 
now, I simply point out that the work 
of this group, though known and re- 
spected by some in the international 
community, does not receive the kind 
of legitimate recognition necessary for 
policy intervention and change. In fact, 
despite the work being done on a 
number of levels, there is no single 
coherent international mechanism for 
information collection, verification 
units in the field; the need for methods 
of prioritizing by human rights moni- 
tors in order to bring sigdicant atten- 
tion and resources to bear on 
important cases; the need to link early 
warning with contingency prepared- 
ness; and the fact that the UN system 
effectively lost its capacity to analyze 
early warning information when it dis- 
banded the Office for Research and 
Collection of Information (ORCI). 
Other units asked to take on the role 
formerly played by ORCI are too op- 
erational in focus to act as the central 
repository for the kind of 'soft intelli- 
gence' needed to generate early warn- 
ing signals for contingency planning 
in preventive diplomacy and peace- 
keeping operations. Add to all this, the 
cloak of secrecy and self-interest that 
continues to permeate national and 
international fora in respect of hu- 
manitarian assistance and response, 
and you begin to understand why 
there has been little significant 
progress in relating early warning to 
early action (Millwood 1995). 
The Actors 
Reviewing what is being done today 
on early warning supports what has 
been said about dissonance among 
major actors. There is a distinct lack of 
coordination and communication be- 
tween those who are actively working 
in the field, and those who could profit 
from a reliable early warning system. 
On the active side, those most engaged 
are either academics or NGOs. 
Ted Robert Gurr (Centre for Inter- 
national Development and Conflict 
Management, University of Mary- 
land) and Barbara Harff (U.S. Naval 
Academy, Annapolis, MD) are leading 
researchers in the fields of genocide 
and political violence. In their work, 
they have come up with a series of in- 
dicators that measure and predict the 
degree of risk faced by various minor- 
ity groups worldwide. The system of 
indicators developed by Gurr and his 
academic associates derives from a 
complex data set aggregation exercise, 
and findings come out at regular inter- 
vals in various academic journals. The 
work of Alex Schmidt of PIOOM 
(Interdisciplinary Research Pro- 
gramme on Root Causes of Human 
Rights Violations, Leiden University, 
Netherlands) has a similar objective, 
but focuses on human rights and the 
rule of law as the parameters for the 
study. Although Gurr and Schmidt 
have made excellent progress in their 
areas of research, their systems are as 
yet neither operational as a basis for 
'soft intelligence' reporting, nor stand- 
ardized in ways that would make ap- 
plication to the sensitive areas of 
political analysis feasible for most poli- 
cyrnakers. 
Gurr and Schmidt are not alone. A 
number of social scientists are engaged 
in the development of conceptual 
frameworks in early warning theory. 
Some participate in an ongoing discus- 
sion within international studies con- 
cerning the design of a system to 
provide the UN system with early 
warning of a variety of international 
crises. The October 1995 issue of the 
Mershon International Studies Review 
continues the debate on the develop- 
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ment of an Internet-based early wam- 
ing system, aspects of which are dis- 
cussed below. 
At the level of policy research, inter- 
est is centred in the liberal tradition of 
institutions like the Brookings Insti- 
tute, Harvard University and the 
Carter Institute in Atlanta with ongo- 
ing studies of conflict resolution, 
peacekeeping, development, internal 
displacement, and related governance 
issues based in and on shifting statist 
and humanitarian norms. 
NGO involvement in early warning 
has focused on conflict prevention. A 
noteworthy recent initiative, led by 
Kumar Rupersinghe, the Director of 
International Alert in London, brings 
together a consortium of humanitarian 
NGOs to discuss ways to develop co- 
ordinated modalities for conflict pre- 
vention based on an effective early 
warning network. Rupersinghe has 
tried to involve others, like Gurr and 
associates, and to incorporate the re- 
sults of the efforts of the United Na- 
tions Inter-Agency Consultations of 
New Flows of Refugees and Displaced 
Persons that met regularly untilspring 
1995. This latter group produced a list 
of "41 Indicators for the Early Warning 
of Population Movements at a Coun- 
try Level" which would profit from 
testing in the context of countries of 
origin. The hope is that the NGOs will 
take it on as the Inter-Agency Consul- 
tations have ceased, and there appears 
to be little support for their resump- 
tion without a more practical mandate 
than in the past. 
The United Nations and Early 
Warning 
The UN is developing two early warn- 
ing systems, both within the Depart- 
ment of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). 
The first is the Humanitarian Early 
Warning System (HEWS) which re- 
sides at DHA, New York. HEWS has 
specific responsibility for early warn- 
ing and for some time has been the fo- 
cus for the development of a system of 
reliable alerts to warn the international 
community of impending complex 
humanitarian emergencies. The unit 
does not produce reports for the public 
domain, and most of its achievements 
have been internal, supporting infor- 
mation needs on complex emergencies 
through, for example, the production 
of country profiles and daily HEWS 
Flashes that summarize media and in- 
ternal UN reporting on hot spots 
worldwide. 
The second UN initiative is 
ReliefWeb, a dynamic, interactive glo- 
bal information system, on the 
Internet, for assisting the humanitar- 
ian relief ~ommunity.~ The idea is to 
have several categories of information 
available on a 24-hour basis that will 
cover a wide gamut of information 
from the emergency-specific and logis- 
tical through financial tracking and 
policy analysis. It is an ambitious 
project that will require resources, sup- 
port at the highest levels by donors and 
the UN system, careful coordination, 
and multiple platform dissemination 
to link field operations to the global 
network. At the same time, it must 
ensure that relief agencies communi- 
cate between and among themselves 
in the field where it counts. Whether or 
not ReliefWeb will act as an early 
warning system will depend on the 
willingness of agencies to share reli- 
able and time sensitive information 
from field operations. Most impor- 
tantly, it will depend on how that in- 
formation is translated into action. 
That is the critical need and the least 
likely to receive support at the highest 
levels of policy and decision making. 
International Cooperation 
No single organization has the capac- 
ity or resources to collect and dissemi- 
nate the information required to serve 
humanitarian operations and the 
agencies involved. Consequently, co- 
operation at all levels, with govern- 
ments, international organizations, 
other members of the UN family and 
non-governmental organizations 
must lead to helpful divisions of labour 
in regard to the collection, treatment 
and exchange of information. More- 
over, all the relevant actors involved in 
the development of an effective early 
warning system must be brought to- 
gether in order to avoid duplication, 
take advantage of what already exists, 
and introduce the principle of coopera- 
tion along with the virtue of trust in a 
system that is almost hopelessly cyni- 
cal of its own best interests. In order 
that necessary steps are taken at the 
highest political level, agreement be- 
tween and among major stakeholders 
must include support for early warn- 
ing initiatives that speak directly to the 
need to link a system of reliable alerts 
with early action. In establishing such 
a system, the challenge for the interna- 
tional community will be linking infor- 
mation to policy planning and 
implementation. Moreover, systems 
that allow for rapid and frequent dis- 
semination of such reports to major 
actors are as important as the knowl- 
edge that the information received is 
verifiable. Most importantly, the des- 
ignation of a lead agency, with a man- 
date for early warning and conflict 
prevention, outside the UN system, 
has the potential to go the distance in 
successfully addressing and tran- 
scending some of the rival preroga- 
tives inherent in the existing system 
which impede much-needed swift and 
decisive action in the face of uncer- 
tainty. 
Recently, a proposal arrived from 
the Centre for Refugee Studies at York 
University in Toronto, Canada, for the 
development of an academic-policy 
consortium to create a workable, effec- 
tive, economic, and cost-recoverable 
early warning system to deal with hu- 
manitarian emergencies, complex 
emergencies, and conflict areas.3 But 
as Peter Brecke of the School of Inter- 
national Affairs, Georgia Institute of 
Technology asserts, warning is not a 
politically neutral activity: "Early 
warning concerning natural calamities 
that demand humanitarian relief ef- 
forts is not problematic. Early warning 
of violent conflicts so that conflict-pre- 
vention activities can be initiated 
causes anxiety for many. Although 
conflict early warning may reduce the 
need to provide humanitarian relief, it 
creates pressure to act in ways that 
collide with state sovereignty (and in 
some cases cost a lot of money)." Given 
this reality, Brecke (1995,322) contin- 
10 Rejirge, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1996) 
